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Challenging the widely held view that Hobbes is an atheist, Kody W. Cooper claims that Hobbes’s political theory is rooted inextricably in the Aristotelian- Thomistic tradition 
of natural law. While there are clear departures from the Thomis-
tic tradition in Hobbes’s civil philosophy, Cooper suggests that 
Hobbes is not advancing an a- religious, a- theistic political theory 
but is working consciously in the Thomistic- Aristotelian paradigm 
of natural law, a paradigm from which his own view emerges by 
way of modification. What is novel in Hobbes’s view, according 
to Cooper, is not the rejection of the Aristotelian- Thomistic be-
lief that human person is a political animal, not the incapacity of 
reason to discover a common good, and not the assertion that the 
commonwealth, as the constructive effort of persons, is thereby in-
dependent of theistic design. The novelty, in Cooper’s view, is that 
Hobbes thins out the essential core of goods that Aquinas takes to 
be common to all human beings—which include bodily life and 
health, family and childrearing, friendship, knowledge, and reli-
gion—to bodily life and health alone (110, 112). Working within 
this modified Thomistic perspective, Hobbes then attaches to the 
pursuit of bodily security, via the laws of nature, as the compelling 
commands of God, the necessity of willing peace and reciproc-
ity. The thrust of Cooper’s argument is that once recognized as 
working in a stripped- down, natural law paradigm, interpretive 
difficulties dissolve, and Hobbes’s theism emerges as an integral 
part of his political theory. 
Given that Cooper’s thesis puts him at odds with much of the 
secondary literature, this book is as concerned with reading the 
text properly as it is with showing that received interpretations are 
false. A breakdown of (a selection of) sub- theses is: that Hobbes 
believes we can know by natural reason that God exists (34); that 
Hobbes has embedded in his writings elements of each of Aqui-
nas’s five arguments or ways that reason judges that God exists 
(35); that the only way to make sense of Hobbes’s statements that 
there are evil persons in the state of nature is through a theistic 
framework, because evil presupposes breach of law and God se-
cures the laws of nature as commands in foro interno (75); that 
Hobbesian moral and civil science depends on a human nature 
that we can know, and that God, as the creator and designer of 
humankind, provides the ultimate foundation for human nature 
(91); that, as for Aquinas, reason has the ability to apprehend cer-
tain goods as objectively desirable and so, for Hobbes, does rea-
son grasp that life is a good to be pursued (96, 100); that God’s 
creation of persons as rational beings is sufficient to endow the 
dictates of practical reason with a legal character (157, 60); that 
the necessity to pursue the end of life or the means of life does 
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While, of course, no one can prove the provenance of these 
beliefs, it would strengthen Cooper’s case substantially if he could 
show that the parallels he finds, many of which involve relatively 
commonplace philosophical thoughts, are actually borrowed from 
natural law authors, that these beliefs are not similar only by ac-
cident, or that beliefs Hobbes held in common with Aristotle and 
Aquinas were borrowed from Aquinas. While a lot of effort is 
spent highlighting these similarities, it does little to show that 
Hobbes must have taken natural law seriously, that only natural 
law theorists can interpret Hobbes properly, or that, setting aside 
his personal beliefs, Hobbes’s political theory cannot be reformu-
lated on the basis of natural philosophy alone.
Overall, this book will appeal to any who are searching for a 
thorough and consistent reading of Hobbes as a natural law theo-
rist, and it is especially valuable for highlighting the interpretive 
commitments that are involved in taking Hobbes’s theism seri-
ously. While this book is unlikely to persuade interpreters who 
already disagree, Cooper does show, compellingly, that it is pos-
sible to interpret Hobbes consistently and without contradiction as 
working consciously in the tradition of natural law.
not have the force of law for the atheist (162, 178–179); and that 
“the normative value of proper biological functioning is lawlike, 
for Hobbes” (211).
While Cooper presents a thought- provoking and thorough ac-
count, one cannot help wishing, on a critical note, that there was 
more textual evidence, especially since Cooper’s claim is not less 
than that the most celebrated and influential scholarly interpreta-
tions of Hobbes’s natural law theory are “misleading and even fun-
damentally incorrect” (2). While Cooper’s claims are not without 
evidence, his arguments tend to focus either on disproving sec-
ondary literature or on showing that Hobbes held similar views 
to Aquinas. Cooper finds as significant points of similarity that 
Hobbes “retains the Aristotelian- Thomistic distinction between 
the merely apparent good and the genuine or real good” (98); 
that Hobbes expresses only the view that beatitude is not avail-
able in this life when he denies that there is a summum bonum, a 
point that “is actually in complete agreement with Aquinas” (108); 
that Hobbes’s borrowing “is manifest in his theory of persons as 
 makers of the commonwealth, [which] takes over the Aristotelian- 
Thomistic principle of mimesis” (183); that, “strikingly,” Hobbes 
insists, as does Aquinas, “on the need for positive law to enforce 
the demands of natural law” (192); that Hobbes’s conclusion “that 
human aptitude for society must be acquired through discipline 
and instruction by right reason” is the Thomistic position (194); and 
that “Aquinas and Hobbes are in agreement that peace through 
commonwealth is reasonable and necessary for human happiness 
or flourishing” (197). Cooper suggests that Hobbes’s postulate of 
natural reason, that we endeavor to preserve our lives, is function-
ally equivalent to Aquinas’s synderesis as the first indemonstrable 
principles of moral reasoning (109). 
